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The Brazilian experience  
as ‘role model’ 
Christopher Gaffney1 
Brazil’s World Cup experience has been instructive for future hosts, in that it has presented a 
number of problems related to the transparency of the bidding process, the size of the country 
and the ambitions of urban authorities, the emergence of strong opposition to infrastructure 
spending and privatisation, and critical governmental interventions that eventually allowed for 
the successful realisation of the event. 
The major Brazilian sports confederations, the Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) 
and the Comitê Olímpico Brasileiro (COB), have tended to be dominated by a narrow range 
of vested interests for decades.2 As these two organisations took the lead role in the bidding 
for the World Cup and Olympics, respectively, their institutional cultures have negatively 
impacted the transparency of the events themselves.3 The lack of public consultation and 
open debate in the preparation of bid dossiers continues to be one of the major obstacles to 
ensuring that mega-events serve the broadest range of stakeholders.4 
The case of Brazil is exemplary in that the bid dossier for the 2014 World Cup was never 
made public and the Rio 2016 bid book has become the de facto urban planning document 
for the city of Rio de Janeiro.5 These are problematic developments because, in the former 
case, there is no public record of what the CBF and the Brazilian government proposed or 
promised to the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA); subsequent 
developments had major impacts on 12 Brazilian cities. In the latter case, the city of Rio de 
Janeiro is being transformed to match the proposed ‘Olympic city’, with dire consequences 
for tens of thousands of families, which have been forcibly removed from their homes.6 
The logistical challenges of organising a World Cup in Brazil were exacerbated by 
the ambitions of the Brazilian executive branch to have as many host cities as possible; 
FIFA required between eight and ten host cities, but the Brazilians opted for 12. None of 
the 18 potential host cities circulated their proposals for public input prior to or during 
the bidding process. This meant not only an increase in costs and impacts, but that several 
cities without notable football traditions would acquire FIFA-standard stadiums, five-star 
hotels and world-class training facilities. Although the realisation of the World Cup in Manaus, 
Cuiabá, Brasília and Natal may have accelerated necessary upgrades to airports, these 
cities have not experienced an improvement in urban mobility or basic services, or an 
increase in tourism.7 To the contrary, these cities have gone into debt since the World Cup to 
maintain ‘white elephant’ stadiums that will remain a burden on municipal budgets for the 
foreseeable future.8 
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In addition to the problem of ‘white elephant’ infrastructure, all the World Cup projects 
were exempted from normal contracting procedures so that the building process could 
be accelerated. The combined effects of the so-called Differential Public Procurement 
Regime (RDC in Portuguese) and an exemption to the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, which 
requires cities to have balanced budgets, have pushed all the World Cup host cities into 
debt, as municipal and state governments took advantage of the situation to build on 
a massive scale in an accelerated time frame.9 The inclusion of infrastructure projects in 
World Cup development agendas typically falls under the category of ‘legacy’, but when 
Figure 3.9 Estádio Nacional de Brasília Mané Garrincha: Brasilia’s white elephant
Sources: Fédération Internationale de Football Association, Estádio Nacional de Brasília – Brasília, http://pt.fifa.com/worldcup/destination/stadiums/stadium=5002284/index.
html; Washington Post, ‘High costs, corruption claims mar Brazil World Cup’, 12 May 2014.
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these projects occur under emergency planning and execution regimes their transparency 
tends to decrease.10 
Another problematic of the 2014 World Cup was the way in which municipal and state 
governments interpreted FIFA’s host city demands. When FIFA declared, as early as 2007, 
that Brazil did not possess a single stadium capable of hosting a World Cup match, the 
Brazilians interpreted this to mean that they should build or renovate 12 stadiums that met or 
exceeded all FIFA’s technical requirements.11 As the FIFA documents had no provisions for 
social, economic or urban sustainability, however, the Brazilians constructed stadiums that 
are isolated from their urban contexts, very expensive to maintain and dependent on imported 
technologies, and that do not fit within the cultural paradigms of Brazilian ‘fandom’. The 
majority of the World Cup stadiums were formerly public installations that were demolished 
and rebuilt with public money, and are now operated through so-called public–private 
partnerships (typically 30-year concessions won by the civil construction firms hired for the 
rebuilding).12 This has resulted in a transfer of public space to private interests and an increase 
in the cost of attending football matches, and further exacerbated the crises of social and 
urban fragmentation in Brazil.13 
Beginning with the FIFA Confederations Cup in 2013, it became apparent that Brazil 
had exposed itself to significant risk in the pursuit of mega-events. An a priori assumption 
of hosting mega-events is that they will serve to attract international media attention, and 
stimulate tourism, business and national pride. With the advent of massive protests against 
the exorbitant public spending on the World Cup, it became clear that Brazil was risking its 
international image and that the Workers’ Party, the largest element in the governing coalition, 
was alienating its political base through its acquiescence to FIFA’s stringent demands. The 
chronic lateness or incompleteness of stadium, airport, communications and transportation 
infrastructure, as well as the public displays of disaffection between the 2014 Local Organising 
Committee (LOC) and FIFA, further hurt Brazil’s image abroad.14 
The unprecedented scale and intensity of the protests during the 2013 Confederations 
Cup focused greater international attention on FIFA’s business model than ever before. The 
federal government dealt with this crisis situation through heavy-handed policing and strategic 
negotiations with key social actors.15 Despite the very real threats to a successful staging of 
the contest, including pitched battles between police and protesters at many venues, and 
repeated denunciations of human rights abuses, event organisers and international observers 
alike declared it a success. 
Emboldened by the effectiveness of protests in bringing attention to the impact of the 
World Cup on Brazilian cities, protesters organised further strikes and public actions through-
out 2013 and into 2014. One of the federal government’s primary responses was to create 
a 10,000-strong military shock force that could be rapidly deployed to potential trouble 
spots during the World Cup.16 This force, combined with an estimated BRL 1.9 billion (some 
US$780 million) in federal security spending and an additional 15,000 security officers, 
ensured that protesters threatening the staging of the World Cup would be contained.17 For 
the final, there were no fewer than 25,000 police personnel in Rio de Janeiro, and 19 activists 
were arrested on the eve of the match.18 
Another major risk to the realisation of the 2014 World Cup was the derelict state of 
Brazil’s urban and inter-urban transportation. In order to guarantee uninterrupted urban traffic 
circulation and inter-city flights during the World Cup, each host city decreed a holiday on 
game days. This effectively cleaned the streets of their habitual users, diminishing the risk 
of traffic jams, overstretched metro services or crowded airports.19 The suspension of 
urban normalcy across the Brazilian host cities was key to the operational success of the 
World Cup. 
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The response of the international sports organisations to the problems of hosting the 
2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics has been tepid. Partially as a result of the pursuit 
of FIFA-standard stadiums for the World Cup, Brazilian football tickets are now the 
most expensive in the world relative to the national minimum wage.20 There has been no 
institutional reform of the cloistered and opaque CBF, and FIFA appears content to follow 
the Brazilian model of hosting in Russia and Qatar, where dissent and public protests are 
much less likely. 
The preparations for the 2016 Summer Olympics are worryingly similar to those of the 
World Cup, although their effects are concentrated in Rio de Janeiro. The construction of 
three non-governmental regulatory agencies to deal with the financing and execution 
of Olympic-related projects has eroded democratic institutions and created significant 
vacuums of responsibility.21 Large-scale infrastructure projects that are part of Olympic and 
Paralympic transportation planning have removed tens of thousands from their homes without 
due process or compensation.22 These projects are accelerating and their impacts increasing 
as the Olympic deadline approaches. 
The multiple levels of authority and bureaucracy have created a kind of shell game, in 
which no one agency or individual is responsible for the impact of a given project. The 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), for example, is focused only on the delivery of 
housing, transportation, brand protection and venues for its competition; it is not concerned 
with how these projects are developed, or their impacts on residents.23 The Comitê 
Organizador dos Jogos Olímpicos e Paralímpicos Rio de Janeiro 2016 (Rio 2016) is preoc-
cupied with Games operations, not infrastructure development.24 Two governmental over-
sight organisations (the Autoridade Público Olímpico and Empresa Municipal Olímpica) 
are responsible for project delivery, but the city government has taken the lead on the trans-
portation infrastructure that will link the nominal Olympic zones.25 These multi-layered 
interventions are predicated on the content of and subsequent changes to the Rio 2016 bid 
book – a document that was prepared behind closed doors and chosen as the winning 
bid in the October 2009 IOC session in Copenhagen. All these projects benefit elite sectors 
of Rio’s vast metropolitan area, while socialising the costs and localising the negative impacts 
in Rio’s poorest communities.26 
It may be that the experience of Brazil 2014 and Rio 2016 will mark both the inter- 
ventionist apogee and the social nadir of the era of mega-event gigantism.27 The massive 
public protests that rocked Brazil have sent a strong signal to the international community: 
sports mega-events are not worth it. While it is yet to be seen what the public reaction 
to Rio 2016 will be, the declining number of cities that are willing to host the Summer 
and Winter Olympics is perhaps a sign that the protesters’ message has been heard. 
Unfortunately, the FIFA World Cup in Russia looks as if it will employ the same kinds of 
security measures, privatisations and suspensions of urban normalcy learnt from Brazil’s 
‘successful’ World Cup.28 
At the heart of the mega-event problem is a lack of transparency in bidding and building, 
an absence of public participation and deliberation and an unequal sharing of the economic 
burden between hosts and rights holders. Because the IOC and FIFA are monopolistic rights 
holders that enforce strict financial, political, infrastructural, security, communication and 
other requirements for their events, but are unwilling to pay for any of these, the result is that 
citizens, cities and countries are forced to pay so that others can play.29 Global and local 
resistances to these processes have been growing for some time.30 The bidding process 
continues to be as opaque and non-participatory as ever. As the Brazilian experience 
has shown, this has dire consequences for cities, for economies and for the guarantee of 
human rights. 
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